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In 1847, the British polymath William Whewell pointed out that the sci-
ences for which he, in 1837, had coined the term “palætiological” have much
in common and that they may reﬂect light upon each other by being treated
together. This recommendation is here put into practice in a speciﬁc way, to
wit, not by comparing the palaetiological sciences that Whewell distinguished
himself but by comparing the general historical development of the scientiﬁc
study of the four broad palætiological domains that he enumerated in
1847: the solar system, the Earth, its vegetable and animal creation, and
man.
For wide and various as their subjects are, it will be found that [the
palætiological sciences] have all certain principles, maxims, and rules
of procedure in common; and thus may reﬂect light upon each other
by being treated together. William Whewell (1847, 1, p. 640)
1. Introduction
In its modern meaning, the term “science” refers to a both diachronically and
synchronically multifaceted and heterogeneous subculture. Even the long
quest for a delineation of a method that all the sciences supposedly have in
common has proven to be futile.1 Likewise, Thomas Kuhn’s historical de-
velopment model of sciences, including the structure that supposedly is
shared by all scientiﬁc revolutions, has not withstood critical examination
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1. For an overview of this quest, see, e.g., Paul Hoyningen-Huene 2013.
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(e.g., Reingold 1980). Michel Foucault’s (1970) somewhat similar devel-
opment pattern has not convinced historians either, even though it was
restricted to only a few sciences.2 However, that does not mean that sci-
ences have nothing at all in common nor that there are no groups of sci-
ences which have some signiﬁcant features in common.
One example of the latter kind of sciences are the so-called palætiological
sciences: the sciences in which, as William Whewell (1837, 3, p. 481) put
it, “the object is, to ascend from the present state of things to a more ancient
condition, from which the present is derived by intelligible causes.”3 In a
table in The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (1847, 2, p. 117), he deﬁned
the fundamental idea by which these sciences are inspired as “historical cau-
sation” and distinguished them from other categories of sciences such as the
pure mathematical sciences, the pure motional sciences and the mechanical
sciences, which each were inspired by their own fundamental idea or
conception. His two exemplary palætiological sciences were geology and
comparative philology, but he realized that some other sciences also had pa-
lætiological divisions, such as astronomy and the science that he, in 1840,
began to call “biology.” He also distinguished three components in palætio-
logical sciences: a descriptive component, an aetiological component (i.e.,
the discovery of causes and their limits) and a ﬁnal theoretical component
or “theory of facts” which resulted from “the application of causes well
understood to facts well ascertained” (Whewell 1847, 1, p. 664). They were
not (to be) practiced in a chronological fashion but each component de-
pended to some extent on advances in the preceding component.
In the said table, he enumerated four palætiological sciences: geology, dis-
tribution of plants and animals, glossology (history of languages) and ethnog-
raphy. Strangely enough, biology was not categorized as a palætiological
science. It appeared in the separate category of “organical sciences” and was
based on the fundamental idea of organization. This nicely illustrates what
will be reiterated below: a synthetic life science was initially not founded
upon the idea of historical or evolutionary causation. Put differently: it
was, in contrast with the speciﬁc study of the post-Deluge distribution of
plants and animals, initially not conceived as a palætiological science.
2. Foucault excavated three discrete and discontinuous épistèmês (ἐπιστήμη is Greek
for science or knowledge)—sets of rules that were not consciously grasped but shaped and
shape what can be thought and said—in the history of Western thought and demonstrated
how they corresponded with three distinct phases in the historical development of three
sciences: linguistics, biology, and economics. He criticized the history of ideas, arguing that
it presupposed continuity, whereas his archaeology or excavation revealed sharp discontinu-
ities between these three different systems of thought.
3. It was a combination of the term “aetiological,” sometimes used for the sciences
which treat of causes, and “paleontology,” the study of beings which formerly existed.
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More important for the present paper are the four broad palætiological do-
mains that he distinguished: the solar system—the then known universe as a
whole was still deemed to be a steady-state system—, the Earth, its vegetable
and animal creation, and man (Whewell 1847, 1, p. 654).4 Whewell’s work
on the (philosophy of ) palætiological sciences has received some attention
from philosophers and historians of science.5 However, the historical develop-
ment of the scientiﬁc study of these four broad palætiological domains has not
yet been investigated from a comparative perspective. Nor have philosophers
or historians invested much time or energy in the question whether there is
any truth in Whewell’s suggestion that the palætiological sciences might re-
ﬂect light upon each other by being treated together.6 In the mid-nineteenth
century, only one of his four palætiological domains had become the subject of
a palætiological master science: Earth. In the ensuing decades, the modern
master science of biology would gradually come into being (as a palætiological
science), whereas, in the twentieth century, the cosmos became the subject of a
third palætiological science, once the realisation dawned that it was a palæ-
tiological domain of its own: cosmology (section 2).
These three modern palætiological sciences form the main subject of the
present paper. In the conclusion, I will brieﬂy come back to the intriguing
question as to why Whewell’s fourth broad palætiological domain—man—
did not (yet) inspire a fourth palætiological master science (although Whewell
himself already distinguished several human palætiological disciplines,
such as the aforementioned science of ethnography, in the same way that
he also already recognized biogeography as a biological palætiological
discipline). The philosophical question as to the ontological nature of the his-
torical development of Earth, life and the cosmos—more or less determinis-
tic, as opposed to contingent or stochastic and therefore predictable, as
opposed to unpredictable—also largely falls beyond the scope of this paper.
One thing is crystal clear: the discovery of the deep history of, respec-
tively, Earth, life and the universe played a crucial role in the genesis of
geology, biology and cosmology, respectively, as, of course, was to be ex-
pected of palætiological sciences. It separates, as we shall see, the prehis-
tory of these sciences from their actual histories. Moreover, in the case of
the sister sciences geology and biology, the resemblance doesn’t end there.
One of the additional parallels is that the discovery of the deep history of
4. See, e.g., also pp. 638–39, 700. For this paper, I have taken the liberty of consid-
ering, with the beneﬁt of hindsight, the cosmos as a whole as a Whewellian, palætiological
domain.
5. See Quinn 2016, p. 11.
6. O’Hara (1996) demonstrates the continuing validity of Whewell’s classiﬁcation
through a study of historical representation in three different palætiological subﬁelds: sys-
tematics, historical linguistics, and textual transmission.
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Earth and life, respectively, facilitated the integration of various Earth and
life sciences into two master sciences (i.e., geology and biology) by providing
them with a common and integrating, descriptive (describendum) and/or
explanatory (explanandum and explanans) focus. It should immediately be
added and emphasized, though, that not all Earth and life disciplines were
(and/or are) equally involved in this integrative exercise.7 Which, in turn, is
one of the reasons why the rich and multifaceted history of geology and bi-
ology cannot be reduced to this pattern. It merely constitutes—or so it will
be argued—the core or the backbone of the historical development of these
master sciences (section 3).8 A look at the history of geology and biology
through the lens of this common Bauplan is, in any case, heuristically inter-
esting as it reveals, or sheds somewhat new light on, several peculiarities in
those histories.
2. Cosmology
I can be brief about the (pre)history of cosmology. He does not use the
speciﬁc terms “prehistory” and “history” but in a recent paper, Jacob
Pearce (2017) points out that it is only in the early twentieth century,
when the cosmos was gradually interpreted as a palætiological or evolu-
tionary phenomenon, that the cosmos as a whole became an object of mod-
ern scientiﬁc discovery, even though cosmological questions have evidently
been around since long before then. It was Einstein’s general theory of rel-
ativity (1917), the theoretical source of inspiration for the Big Bang model,
that marked this birth of modern or scientiﬁc cosmology. Although it
should be added that “cosmology as a serious scientiﬁc discipline began
much later, not becoming established until as late as the 1960s” (Pearce
2017, p. 18). The intervening period (i.e., 1920–1970) was characterized
7. Peter J. Bowler and John V. Pickstone point out, in this respect, that we should not
assume “that evolution was a major determinant in all biological sciences. Much of late nine-
teenth century biology can be proﬁtably studied in terms of the changing patterns of work
within established areas such as morphology or physiology (…)” (Bowler and Pickstone 2009,
pp. 3–4). Many life sciences were indeed only Darwinized in the twentieth century and some,
such as medicine, remain to be fully Darwinized.
8. A complete history of these sciences should for example also explicate national dif-
ferences or peculiarities or investigate the impact of philosophies, cultural movements, new
technologies and so forth on their historical development. As Guntau puts it: “the rise of
geology as a scientiﬁc discipline did not occur on the basis of a single event” (Guntau 1978,
p. 287). Rudwick (2005, p. 7) also emphasizes this in his historical survey of the “histor-
icization of the earth, in what became the science of geology”: it should not be confounded
with a comprehensive history of geology. Elsewhere, he puts it thus: “I must emphasize that
[Bursting the Limits of Time] and [Worlds Before Adam] have not set out to describe the history
of the earth sciences as a whole, even during the few decades that the volumes jointly cover”
(Rudwick 2008, p. 555).
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by a dispute between the Big Bang model and the Steady State model
(Kragh 1996). There is, as we shall see, an equivalent for this preparadig-
matic period in the history of biology.
Since then (i.e., 1970), the historical style has become the “bedrock of
[cosmology] and the condition of its possibility…It has conﬁgured and
reconﬁgured the terrain of possibilities for modern cosmology. Approaches
that do not build on the foundations laid by the historical style are, by and
large, not seen as possible ways of doing cosmology” (Pearce 2017, p. 18).
Pearce makes, in this respect, also the comparison with geology and biol-
ogy: “In the same way that historical explanations are given in geology…
features of the universe are now universally understood in terms of histo-
ricity” (Pearce 2017, p. 17). And: “It should be noted that the historical
style was already present in some other disciplines at the beginning of the
twentieth century—such as evolutionary theories in biology in the nine-
teenth century (Bowler 1989) or historical accounts of the earth in eigh-
teenth century geology (Gohau 1990). Objects of scientiﬁc inquiry were
interpreted in terms of their historicity” (Pearce 2017, p. 18). Lastly, he
also points out that, with recent atemporal “ensemble” type multiverse
proposals, “a certain type of ahistorical reasoning has been reintroduced
to cosmological discourse…” (Pearce 2017, p.18). Interestingly, this kind
of reasoning has also been reintroduced to modern or late-twentieth cen-
tury geological and biological discourse.
3. Geology and Biology
The aforementioned historical Bauplan of geology and biology consists of
three components or phases which will be treated in consecutive order: a
prehistorical phase, the emergence of the notion of a science, dedicated to
the study of Earth and life (i.e., the conceptual birth of these sciences), and
the subsequent history of geology and biology, characterized by a certain
integration of various Earth and life sciences, facilitated by the discovery of
the deep history of Earth and life.
3.1. The Prehistory
Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent (2003) points out that the standard period-
ization of nineteenth century chemistry often reﬂects modern divisions of
that science into inorganic, organic, and physical chemistry.9 Smith (1995,
p. 105) likewise rejects a “pillarized” approach to the historical study of the
9. Porter (1980) calls this “tunnel histories”: histories that trace “the progress of modern
scientiﬁc disciplines, rather than exploring the cognitive landscapes of the past” (p. 286). He
adds that “It has been all too common to take for granted the nature and distribution of
present scientiﬁc disciplines, their contents and their parameters, as if they timelessly reﬂected
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human sciences, “an approach that excavates foundations for each of the
modern psychological or social sciences, falsely projecting back socially con-
structed categories into another age.”10 In the case of geology and biology,
the opposite occurs: the modern unity is often projected back into a frag-
mented past. Certain Earth and life phenomena were indeed already known
and reﬂected upon or empirically investigated, long before the invention of
geology and biology, but not in an integrated way and not under the spe-
ciﬁc headings of geology and biology but rather under the general head-
ings, or in the general context of, endeavours or ﬁelds like biblical
exegesis, travel stories, natural theology and, particularly, natural philoso-
phy and natural history.
Gohau (1990, p. 7) states that what he calls the “prehistory of the earth
sciences” was characterized by a “multiplicity of methods within disci-
plines with little common ground” and a certain aimlessness.11 This is also
what the ﬁrst geologists thought. Looking back at their predecessors, they
were exacerbated by “the aimlessness of previous inquiry: its lack of recog-
nizable order, direction, common goals, research programs” (Porter 1977,
p. 208). The prehistory of geology does indeed encompass a wide and het-
erogeneous array of ﬁelds and endeavors. One example are mythological
accounts of the origin of the Earth. These were, in the seventeenth century,
succeeded by speculative or philosophical cosmogonies and, after the com-
pletion of the heliocentric revolution (i.e., when the Earth’s status could be
detached from that of the whole universe), with mechanical and chemical
geogonies. Another ﬁeld that should be mentioned in a survey of the pre-
history of geology is biblical exegesis or “scholarly inquiry into the written
word” (Porter 1977, p. 11). A good example of this genre is Athanasius
Kircher’s Noah’s Ark (Arca Noë, 1675), a painstaking analysis of the Flood,
based on all the known versions of the biblical text. Kircher was, however,
also the author of The Subterranean World (Mundus Subterraneus, 1668), a
description of the Earth as a complex and dynamic but ahistorical system
which was inspired by the contemporary empirical investigation of nature.
nature” (p. 318). And: “Historians still have much work to do in thinking themselves out of
‘presentist’ disciplinary boundaries, like ‘history of geology’ and ‘history of oceanography’…”
(p. 324).
10. He refers, more particularly, to the habit of situating the birth of the human and
the social sciences, or at least a certain number of them, in the eighteenth century. In re-
ality, there were not only no disciplines in the modern institutional sense in the eighteenth
century, even “the terms and investigative activity making possible such differentiated
scholarship did not exist” (p. 105). For the counterargument, see Graham et al. (1983).
11. However, he at the same time also portrays sixteenth- and seventeenth century the-
ories of the Earth as “the ﬁrst act of our history of geology” (p. 2). Guntau (1978, p. 280)
also refers to the eighteenth century as the “prehistory of geology.”
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It was these kinds of investigations of Earth phenomena that delivered
the empirical and theoretical material for the nineteenth century realiza-
tion of the project of geology. Martin S. J. Rudwick (2005), the doyen of
historians of the Earth sciences, distinguishes more speciﬁcally four eigh-
teenth century ahistorical sciences or ﬁelds of expertise, concerned with the
Earth: mineralogy, physical geography, geognosy and Earth physics.12 The
ﬁrst three belonged to the domain of natural history (i.e., they were de-
scriptive). Mineralogy was the main science and studied and classiﬁed min-
erals, rocks and fossils. Physical geography focused on large-scale surface
features of the planet such as mountains and volcanoes. Geognosy was, like
physical geography, a ﬁeld science, but studied the underground, laid bare
by mining. The fourth ahistorical Earth science, Earth physics, belonged to
the ﬁeld of natural philosophy as it sought to causally understand the phe-
nomena, described and classiﬁed by the natural history disciplines (e.g.,
the reason for the stoniness of rocks or the emplacement of fossils far from
the sea). This discipline would, initially, not participate in the integrated
study of the Earth that emerged in the late eighteenth century.
Rudwick (2005, p. 59) points out that none of these four disciplines
individually, “nor all of them collectively, can be called ‘geology’ without
serious anachronism: the word itself was just beginning to be used regu-
larly, but for yet another kind of scientiﬁc project.” Or rather, for a speciﬁc
kind of analyses, called geotheories, theories which “gave accounts of the
earth’s temporal development deduced mainly from ﬁrst principles rather
than being induced from the particulars of surviving relics of the past: they
described how the earth must (or at least ought to) have developed in the past and
how it would necessarily continue to change in the future, given certain initial con-
ditions and unchanging physical principles” (Rudwick 2005, p. 641; emphasis
added).13 Put differently, theories of the Earth studied the geological
(deep) past of the planet but they saw this past as the equivalent of the
not very eventful or coincident past of the solar system: certain forces
caused the repeated occurrence of the same, predictable phenomena (cycli-
cal geotheories, such as the geotheory of James Hutton or Charles Lyell) or
they steered the development of the Earth in a certain, predictable direc-
tion (directional geotheories, such as the geotheory of René Descartes or
12. See also Rudwick (2004). Likewise, Taylor (1979) argues for the existence of a “pre-
geological” set of Earth disciplines. See also Taylor (2008) and Gohau (2003).
13. Laudan (1987, p. 5) calls them genetic causal theories, a subset of causal theories.
She points out that “some prominent geologists continue to advocate [genetic causal the-
ories], an advocacy that seems to me well-founded (Bowen 1928).” She believes that there
exist two kinds of geology, one that is derived from the tradition of natural history and
another that is derived from the tradition of natural philosophy (Laudan 1982). See, in this
respect, also note 38.
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Buffon). These physical principles not only allowed the savant to predict
the future of the planet but also to predict in retrospect or “retrodict” (cf.
the retrodiction of the position of a star constellation at a particular point
in the past in modern cosmology).
In a similar vein, one cannot use the term “biology” for the seventeenth-
or even eighteenth century study of life phenomena: biology did not exist
in the eighteenth century. Or, as Foucault (1970, p. 139) put it: the pat-
tern of knowledge that has been familiar to us for a hundred and ﬁfty years
is not valid for the previous period. Salomon-Bayet (1981, p. 46) refers in
this respect to the prehistory or archaeology of biology. She argues that the
history of biology only started from the moment that the term “biology”
was coined (1802), because history only starts with the written word.14
Before 1802, we can only speak of life sciences like physiology, natural
history (i.e., inquiry in nature) or anatomy, not of biology. Even the phrase
“life sciences” is anachronistic since it was not used at the time: like the
prehistory of geology, the prehistory of biology encompassed a wide array
of ﬁelds but they were not known as life sciences.
Life phenomena were mostly studied under the general heading of nat-
ural history. Karl Linnaeus’ famous taxonomy of plants, animals and min-
erals is a paradigmatic example. George Cuvier, the father of paleontology,
was professor of natural history in the Collège de France and worked at the
Museum of Natural History. The study of the geographical dispersal of
animals and plants (what we know as biogeography) also mainly belonged
to the domain of natural history, although it started out as an exercise in
biblical exegesis. Confronted with a wealth of new creatures from recently
discovered parts of the world, seventeenth century naturalists and theolo-
gians had to deal with the question whether the Ark could have accommo-
dated all these animals. They circumvented this puzzle by focusing on the
Flood: if the Earth indeed had been submerged, all modern species must
have been on board the Ark, or they would not exist today. This, in turn,
forced them to consider another problem, “namely, the way the earth was
restocked with animals and plants” (Browne 1983, p. 10). The question of
the causes of this process belonged to the domain of natural philosophy,
which, for example, also encompassed plant and animal physiology.
3.2 The Conceptual Birth
The emergence of the notion of a speciﬁc science, dedicated to the study of
Earth and of another science, dedicated to the study of life, formed part of
14. Strictly speaking, her argument is not entirely correct. The modern concept of an
integrated and autonomous scientiﬁc study of life was, as we shall shortly see, indeed in-
vented in 1802, but the term “biology” is older than 1802.
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the complex transition of eighteenth century natural philosophy and nat-
ural history to the modern sciences, also known as the second scientiﬁc
revolution, which explains why historical studies, devoted to these two sci-
ences occupy a central place in the literature about this revolution.15 In
both cases, the general idea of such a science was preceded and facilitated
by an important ontological distinction. One that, so to say, emancipated
the phenomena of Earth and life as independent or autonomous subjects.
In the case of geology, that distinction was, as already indicated above,
that between Earth and the wider cosmos. Early speculations about our
planet referred to “the cosmos as a whole and emphasized cosmology rather
than geology. Only after the astronomical revolution of Copernicus and
Galileo did thoughts about the earth become dissociated from those about
the universe” (Gohau 1990, p. 1). Or, as Porter (1977, p. 11) puts it: “Not
till the total triumph of heliocentrism could the Earth’s status begin to be
detached from that of the whole universe.” Long before that total triumph
(i.e., the late seventeenth century), predecessors of the term “geology”
(geologia or giologia) were already used, though, for speciﬁc phenomena
like “the science of earthly things” (1344, Richard de Bury), “fossilia”
or things that had been unearthed (1603, Ulisse Al-drovandi) and “that
which discusses the Earth and its inﬂuences” (1687, Fabrizio Sessa).16 In
the following century, the term “geology” subsequently came into use for
the non-historical study of the Earth, “with its Furniture”, (Anon. 1731,
p. 388), as it was formulated in The Present State of the Republick of Letters,
or, in the case of John Walker, Regius Professor of Natural history at the
University of Edinburgh, without its “Furniture.”17 These early deﬁnitions
“included almost every aspect of natural history dealing with the earth”
(Dean 1979, p. 37).18
15. See, e.g., Kuhn ([1961] 1977), Cunningham (1988), Brush (1988) and Cunningham
and Williams (1993). The term “science” acquired its modern meaning and the ﬁrst histories
of science were published, “as it could only be, if the practice itself had only just been in-
vented” (Cunningham 1988, p. 386). It is undoubtedly also no coincidence that it was in
1818 that the literary genre of science ﬁction came into being with the publication of Mary
Shelley’s Frankenstein. Or that a few decades later (1834), the term “scientist” was coined. For a
counter argument, see Grant 2007, p. 321.
16. See Dean (1979). He claims that de Bury used the term “geologiam.”
17. “Geology” was, more particularly, coined as an alternative name for one of the two
special parts of natural philosophy “wherein are explained all the particular Phaenomena in
Heaven and Earth” (Anon. 1731, p. 388). These two special parts were astronomy and physics.
However, as the latter term was often used synonymously with natural philosophy in general,
the author proposed an alternative: “geology.” See, e.g., also Martin 1735, pp. 10, 11.
18. The term “history” derives, through the Latin historia, from the Greek word “ἱστορία”
which meant inquiry or knowing by inquiry. The phrase “natural history” is the only phrase
in which this original meaning is retained.
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Kenneth L. Taylor (2008, p. 78) states that, speaking strictly, as late as
1776, there was still no geology: “The term itself had not yet been coined,
at least not with the scientiﬁc meaning it was shortly to acquire.” Three years
later, Horace-Bénédict de Saussure (1779) was probably the ﬁrst savant to
clearly use the term “geology” in its modern, historical meaning.19 From
the 1780’s onward, “geology” also “behaves increasingly as if it were an estab-
lished English word” (Dean 1979, p. 40). Through the founding of the Geo-
logical Society of London in November 1807, the word was given its ﬁnal and
ofﬁcial sanction. Charles Lyell’s (1830–1833, 1, p. 1) deﬁnition from the early
1830s was particularly inﬂuential (his conception of history was not directional
and progressive but that aspect of his work was largely ignored):
Geology is the science which investigates the successive changes that
have taken place in the organic and inorganic kingdoms of nature; it
enquires into the causes of these changes, and the inﬂuences which
they have exerted in modifying the surface and external structure of
our planet.20
A standard modern definition of geology is “The branch of science
concerned with the physical structure and substance of the earth, the
processes which act on these, and the earth’s development since its
formation” (Oxford English Dictionary). It can be misleading though, in
that many contemporary geologists believe that the study of the Earth’s
historical development is not the last goal of their science but either its
only or its ultimate goal, i.e., the goal that “integrates all the other
subdisciplines of geology” (Laudan 1987, p. 2). All geologists aim at gath-
ering “the data and generalizations necessary for the reconstruction of the his-
torical record” (Laudan 1987, p. 2; my italics).
In a similar vein, the status of the phenomenon of life had to be detached
from that of inanimate matter before the concept of a science, speciﬁcally
dedicated to this phenomenon could be conceived. Jacob (1973, p. 33)
has, in this respect, argued that the concept of a living organism, or an entity
19. Referring to this work and to the use, in the 1790s, of the word “geology” by Jean
André Deluc, David R. Oldroyd (1979, p. 231) writes: “We have here an indication of the
establishment of a new science, and moreover one with an explicitly recognized historical
ﬁeld of enquiry.” In his account of the historicization of the Earth in the new science of
geology, Rudwick uses De Saussure’s successful ascent of the Mont Blanc, in 1787, as “a
historian’s golden spike, plunged into the seamless ﬂow of human history” (Rudwick 2005,
p. 22). For other examples of early uses of the term “geology” in its modern meaning, see,
e.g., Cuvier (1810, pp. 133–34) and Brongniart (1816, p. xlvi).
20. Dean (1979, p. 43) calls it “the most inﬂuential deﬁnition of the science ever writ-
ten…”. My aforementioned distinction between the describendum, the explanandum, and
the explanans is clearly discernible in this deﬁnition.
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that contains within itself the principles of formation and regulation, could
not arise until the early nineteenth century (when the concept of biology was
ﬁrst formulated): “Until the end of the eighteenth century there was no clear
boundary between beings and things. The living extended without a break
into the inanimate… There was as yet no fundamental division between the
living and the non-living.”21 And, as had been the case with geology, the
term “biology” was, in the eighteenth century, already used to refer to some
of the prehistorical life disciplines or for certain life phenomena.22 Johann
Planer (1771), for example, used it in the meaning of “botany”; Theodor
Georg Roose (1797) for the phenomenon of vitality, in a book on Lebenskraft;
Thomas Beddoes (1799) for the phenomenon of physiology (“the doctrine of
the living system in all its states”); and Karl Friedrich Burdach (1800) for an
anthropological science: the study of man from a morphological, physiolog-
ical, and psychological perspective.
Michael C. Hanov seems to have been the ﬁrst to use the term biology
in its modern meaning, in a subtitle of his Natural Philosophy or Dogmatic
Physics (Philosophia naturalis sive physica dogmatica) (1762–1768).23 How-
ever, it is only in the early nineteenth century that modern deﬁnitions
of the word biology were formulated. In his multi-volume treatise Biologie,
oder Philosophie der lebenden Natur für Naturforscher und Aerzte (1802–1822,
p. 444, my italics), Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus deﬁned biology thus:
The object of our study will be the different forms and phenomena of
life, those conditions and laws, under which this state will occur, and
those causes through which it is inﬂuenced. The science which works on
these subjects will be called biology, or the science of life. We shall thus
begin to work with material, which has so far been dispersed among many
different disciplines, especially in natural history and theoretical medicine.
This notion of an ahistorical synthetic life science can be seen as the equivalent
of the eighteenth century concept (with nineteenth century extensions) of an
ahistorical science of geology (with or without “Furniture”).24
21. See also pp. 74–5, 88–9. See also Foucault (1970) and Roger (1980). Roger won-
ders whether vitalism was, ultimately, “responsible for the deﬁnition, at the end of the
century, of a new science, uniquely devoted to the study life, and whose name, accordingly,
should be ‘biology’?” (p. 276).
22. It had, in the seventeenth century, even been used in the meaning of “biography.”
See McLaughlin (2002, p. 1n2). For pre-nineteenth century uses of the term “biologie,” see
also Richards (1992) and Müller (1983).
23. See McLaughlin (2002). Schiller (1980) points out that the term biology continued
to be used in various non-modern ways throughout the nineteenth century.
24. Gayon (2004) points out, though, that the total plan of Treviranus’ six volume
work on the philosophy of living nature clearly shows that his biology wanted at the same
time to study the general conditions of the phenomenon of life and to offer an overview of
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In the same year that Treviranus coined the idea of an integrated science of
life, the French naturalist Jean-Baptiste Pierre Antoine de Monet, Chevalier
de Lamarck presented in his Hydrogéologie (1802) a “theory of living bodies”
or “Biology” as the third part of his “physique terrestre” (next to Meteorology
and Hydrogeology, the theory of the external crust of the globe). The obser-
vations, he wrote, that he had made about living bodies, the principal results
of which he had already announced “in the opening lecture of my lecture
series of the year 9 [1801] at the Museum, will become the subject of my
Biology, third and last part of the Terrestrial physics” (Lamarck 1802,
p. 188).25 In 1815 (p. 49), he wrote, in his Histoire naturelle des animaux sans
vertèbres, that
All that is generally common to plants and animals, as all those
features which are, without exceptions, proper to all of these
creatures, should be the sole and wide subject of a particular science
which has not yet been founded, which has even yet no name and
which I shall call biology.26
Roe (2003, p. 416) points out that Treviranus, Lamarck and two other
naturalists (Karl Friedrich Burdach and Marie-François-Xavier Bichat)
all meant something different with the term “biology” but that “all four
saw a need to unify the life sciences in distinction to sciences dealing with
the non-living world.” That uniﬁcation would eventually prove possible,
largely thanks to the discovery and study of evolution.27 Although this
does not imply that biology is generally perceived to be as radically his-
torical as geology is: it is a historical or palætiological science, but, as will
be explained below, in a different, somewhat less straightforward way.
the geographical and historical diversity of life. This may be so, but the deep history of life
was not the central unifying notion of the life science that he had in mind. See also note 27.
25. Lamarck never published the text that he wrote between 1800 and 1802 and called
Biologie, although he incorporated information from it in various works, and in particular in the
Histoire naturelle des animaux sans vertèbres (1815). In his Philosophie zoologique (1809, p. xviii), he
mentioned that he had made use, in this book, of a great amount of material for a planned work
about living bodies, under the title “Biologie” but that this “work will now remain, as far as
I am concerned, without execution.”
26. In the text of his “Biologie,” Lamarck referred to the “formation successive” of living
beings (see Grassé 1944).
27. Richards (2003) points out that, in the work of Lamarck and Treviranus, the word
biology “became immediately associated with the theory of the transmutation of species—a
new term in recognition of the new laws of life” (p. 16). And: “Biology, as it came to birth
at the beginning of the nineteenth century, had evolutionary biology within its genetic
depths” (p. 17). Lamarck certainly was already an evolutionist and Treviranus “thought
the progressive deposition of fossils evinced a modiﬁcation of species over time” (p. 17).
However, as pointed out before (note 24), it would go too far to claim that evolution was,
from the start, the central unifying notion of the biology project.
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There can, nevertheless, be no doubt about the importance of evolution as
“the overall unifying concept of biology.”28
3.3 The History
Rudwick (2005, p. 9) deﬁnes the aforementioned second scientiﬁc revolution
as the time that various “basic sciences of nature were shaped or reshaped into
recognizably modern forms, reconstituted from mature pre-existing branches
of ‘natural history’ and ‘natural philosophy’.”29 Geology was, at that time, in-
deed shaped into its modern form, but not biology. As Roger (1980, p. 277)
puts it: “it is clear that biology did not appear suddenly at the end of the eigh-
teenth century, as Athena sprang from Zeus’s forehead” and “from the exis-
tence of the word we cannot conclude that the science itself existed (1980,
p. 277).”30 It is therefore only with the beneﬁt of hindsight that we can
say that the history of biology started in the beginning of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Secondly, not only were not all Earth and life disciplines equally involved
in this integration, as indicated above, the integrating role and central place of
bio- and geohistory has, in the second half of the twentieth century, also be-
come less important to biology and the modern Earth sciences, respectively.
Taylor (2008) states that the late eighteenth century Earth sciences were
reorganized into a new and distinct science of the Earth. That reorganiza-
tion, inspired by a historical turn in the study of the Earth, has been studied
in detail by Rudwick (2005, 2008).31 He examines how, starting from a
few scattered essays, the marginal genre of what he calls geohistory “became
a routine component of a practice that incorporated all the earlier sciences of
the earth and integrated them into a new science” that “came to be known
as ‘geology’” (Rudwick 2005, p. 291). Geohistory emerged tentatively to-
wards the end of the eighteenth century. It was a time when historicism, or
the belief in the efﬁcacy of explaining phenomena by means of their history,
was rife and when, consequently, “many aspects of man’s culture came to be
viewed from an historical perspective” (Oldroyd 1979, p. 191).32 The
28. See: https://www.livescience.com/44549-what-is-biology.html.
29. See, e.g., also Cunningham and Williams (1993, p. 422) and Cahan (2003, p. 3).
30. He adds: “one might well say that biology did not exist before the time the cell
theory was fully developed” (Roger 1980, p. 277). This statement seems problematic to
me. The idea of a master science of life did already exist before the development of the cell
theory but biology was not yet an integrated science, even after the development of this
milestone in the history of the life sciences.
31. See also Rudwick (2004) and Gohau (2003). My short account of that reorganiza-
tion (i.e., the integration of prehistorical Earth disciplines into the science, called geology)
is largely based on Rudwick’s analysis.
32. These phenomena encompassed, for example, architectural styles, literature and
music. The end of the eighteenth century was also the time that sciences such as archae-
ology, “with an obvious historical concern” (Oldroyd 1979, p. 191), made their appearance.
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historical study of Earth emerged more particularly “by borrowing ideas, con-
cepts, and methods from human historiography” (Rudwick 2005, p. 181).
This novel historiography did not concern the methodologically innovative
work of nineteenth century German historians such as von Ranke, nor the
philosophical or conjectural, large-scale and grandiose histories of eighteenth
century authors such as Voltaire or Herder, as some historians have argued,
“but rather the Cinderella that was scorned by the philosophes: erudite his-
tories of more limited scope,…” (Rudwick 2005, p. 182).33 They were based
on a detailed critical study of massive, textual or artefactual (archaeological)
evidence and described the particularities of how, where and when human
events, during a very speciﬁc period and in a speciﬁc place, had happened.34
This, then, is the moment that the integration of geological disciplines
started: when savants increasingly abandoned the aforementioned specula-
tive geotheoretical approach to the Earth’s past—although some geotheories
already had incorporated some degree of historicity—and began, instead, to
use the geohistorical approach to reconstruct the Earth’s contingent past
(history) with the help of data, techniques and concepts from the “earlier
sciences in the study of earth” (Rudwick 2005, p. 291). Hence the modern
deﬁnition of geology as a “historical, non-experimental science concerned
with past conﬁgurations of the earth. It deals with successions of unique, strictly
unrepeatable events through time” (Hallam 1978, p. 3, my italics).35 It was in-
deed the discovery, towards the end of the eighteenth century, that Earth
not only has an incredibly long past (deep time) but also a largely contin-
gent past (deep history), that was instrumental in forging a number of
separate guilds of savants into a more or less integrated community of geol-
ogists.36 The key factor in their reconstruction was the enrichment of static
33. Like the historian Alexander M. Ospovat, Laudan (1987, pp. 111–12) ascribes the
historical turn in the history of the Earth sciences more speciﬁcally to AbrahamWerner, known
as the father of German geology. He was inspired by the new historical school, centred on
Göttingen. It gave “pride of place to universal history and insisted that history be based on
a critical interpretation of original sources… His insistence on an examination of the rocks was
the geological equivalent of the historian’s examination of the texts.” His big contribution to
historical geology was the central concept of rock formation (Gebirgs-formation). The essential
differences between rocks of various kinds were their mode and time of formation, not their
mineral composition, as the mineralogists emphasized. See also Oldroyd 1979, p. 233.
34. Exciting new discoveries in archaeology (thanks to the excavations of Herculaneum
and Pompeii) also played a role in the emergence of geohistory. Rudwick (2014, p. 93) also
refers to “outstanding scholarship in the writing of human history, as for example in Edward
Gibbon’s celebrated Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776–88).”
35. Hallam reacted to vocal demands that geology departments should give a larger
role to causal theories in their syllabi (in the wake of the success of plate tectonics).
36. As Rudwick (2014) puts it: “… what was far more signiﬁcant than the stretching
of the bare magnitude of the Earth’s timescale was the character of the Earth’s history that
was reconstructed within this greatly extended span of time. As already suggested, deep
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descriptions of three-dimensional rock structures (geognosy) with fossils
(mineralogy): stratigraphy, the description of geological formations in speciﬁc
areas, correlated by the recognition of the same fossils in equivalent forma-
tions. This was not itself historical, but it provided the framework for the
empirical reconstruction of the Earth’s history.
This budding geohistorical and integrating practice soon gathered
steam. Physical geography did initially not contribute much to the genre.
Nor was there, as already noted above, made much progress with causal
problems, such as the formation of rocks or the frequent occurrence of
earthquakes and the existence of volcanoes (“Earth physics”). It was only
in the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century that the geohistorical and the
causal were increasingly brought together and integrated and that geolo-
gists reconstructed an outline of the history of Earth with plausible expla-
nations of many of its main characteristics, thus realising Whewell’s ideal
of applying “causes well understood to facts well ascertained.”37,38 “The
history mattered far more than deep time” (p. 101). And: “Mountains and volcanoes, rocks
and fossils, were recognized as being the products of nature’s history; they could not be
understood solely in terms of causes governed by the timeless ‘laws of nature’” (p. 299).
37. This was, as we saw, the third phase in the development of a palætiological science,
after a descriptive and an aetiological phase.
38. Not everybody agrees, though, with the idea that the geohistorical and the causal were,
in the nineteenth century, brought together and integrated. Laudan (1982, 1987) believes that
the history of geology is, since its origin, characterized by two different and never fully reconciled
geologies: causal (or process) geology and historical geology. Causal geology came ﬁrst and was
later, at the end of the nineteenth century, complemented by the emergence of a strictly historical
geology. Both did not often or usually reinforce each other although they were rarely in direct
conﬂict. She also admits that “geologists wanted consistency between their causal and historical
theories” and “wanted a fully integrated causal-historical story …” (Laudan 1987, p. 16), i.e.,
they wanted to reach Whewell’s third phase. It seems to me, though, that 18th century causal
geotheories may not be confused with the more coincident causes which were later discovered or
postulated by geologists during their reconstruction of geohistory and which cannot be
completely separated from that descriptive reconstruction of geohistory. The main distinction
in the history of geology is (contra Laudan) probably not that between causal geology and his-
torical geology but that between (ahistorical) geotheories (which form a part of causal geology)
and geohistory. Geotheories were, in contrast with geohistory, more concerned with law-like
causes than with coincident causes. It is true, though, that, in the course of the history of geology,
geologists always established the reality of a (contingent) event, “well before its cause or causes
were fully understood; again and again, those arguing that the events did happen have had to
insist that the lack of a convincing cause for them was no reason to deny their historical reality”
(Rudwick 2014, p. 298). Also, the success of plate tectonics, in the 1960s and 1970s, inspired
some geologists “to insist that causal theories [i.e., law-like causes] were more central to geology
than historical reconstruction” (Laudan 1987, p. 3). However, Laudan points out herself that
these (modern) causal theories have a temporal dimension (i.e., they are, like more coincident
causes, part and parcel of geohistory). This is a second reason why the dichotomy between causal
and historical geology is, or can be, misleading.
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chief tool for integrating history and causation was the ‘actualistic’ method
of using the observable present as the key to the unobservable deep past”
(Rudwick 2005, p. 558). Whereas in the mid-seventeenth century, the
Earth had been investigated and conceptualized “by a multiplicity of
methods within disciplines with little common ground,” by the early nine-
teenth century, the “study of strata, fossils, landforms and minerals could
be integrated within geology” (Porter 1977, p. 218).
This unity did not last, though. Geology was so intrinsically associated
with the detailed reconstruction of the Earth’s contingent past that the estab-
lishment of the (less contingent) plate tectonics paradigm—and, ipso facto,
the addition of a deeper causative dimension to the study of the Earth’s
crust—became, in the last decades of the previous century, one cause of the
increasing designation of the study of Earth with alternative phrases like Earth
sciences, a concept that dates from the late 1950s and refers to the study of the
whole Earth.39 A recent analysis of the names of 270 college-level depart-
ments in the US revealed that only 45% now still describe themselves as “De-
partments of Geology” (or equivalents like “Geography and Geology”).40 The
plate tectonics paradigm was deﬁnitely not the only cause of this signiﬁcant
shift, though. Robert Wood (1984) refers in this respect to the important
place that the ahistorical disciplines of geophysics and geochemistry take in
the modern study of the Earth.41 Not only are these disciplines not concerned
with the detailed reconstruction of the Earth’s contingent past, they also use a
different methodology and different instruments. Last but not least, modern
Earth scientists of course also study (again) much of the Earth’s Furniture,
such as its atmosphere and oceans: there has, as Wood (1984, p. 193) puts
it, “been a paradigm shift from Geology’s little Earth to the whole Earth of
the Earth Sciences.”42
39. See Oldroyd 2003, p. 88.
40. See Heaney (2007). The department of Earth Sciences at the UCL in London, for
example, “spans the entire Earth system from the atmosphere to the inner core,” see:
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/earth-sciences.
41. “Such name-changing provides a powerful demonstration of a new purpose and direc-
tion to the science” (p. 181). Wood argues, in general, that the modern Earth sciences did not
emerge from (historical) geology but “from a revival of interest in the alternative, causal approach
made possible by new techniques for studying the earth’s interior” (Bowler 1980, p. 102).
Oldroyd (2009, p. 396) points out that, apart fromWood’s “useful conspectus,” historians “have
not yet formed a synthesized view of the metamorphosis of geology into ‘earth science’.”
42. Oldroyd also refers to “a broader understanding of the earth and its history—
deploying new instruments, very different from the geologist’s traditional hammer, hand lens,
microscope, and other implements” (2009, p. 396). Likewise, Heaney (2007, p. 301) suggests
that the reason why the term geology has become out of fashion is that it is “simply too
narrow to encompass the incredible breadth of what modern Earth scientists do. For the past
two decades, we have been as likely to ﬁnd an atmospheric scientist or an oceanographer
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As indicated above, there exists an equivalent for this relatively recent
schism in the study of Earth in the modern history of biology. Let us, however,
start out with the beginning: the integration, thanks to he discovery of the
deep history of life, of various life sciences or branches into one master science
of life. In the conclusion of On the Origin (1859, p. 455), Charles Darwin already
foresaw “a considerable revolution in natural history.” “When we no longer
look at an organic being as a savage looks at a ship, as at something wholly
beyond his comprehension; when we regard every production of nature as one
which has a history…; when we thus view each organic being, how far more
interesting, I speak from experience, will the study of natural history become!”
(p. 485). Biohistory—the discovery of which was facilitated by the study of
geohistory—did, eventually, indeed revolutionize the study of life: it forged,
in the course of a century after the publication of On the Origin (1859), the life
sciences into a new, integrated science.43 And as had been the case with geo-
history, biohistory was preceded by a speculative, philosophical and ahistorical
biotheory: for Lamarck, evolution was “not a historical phenomenon: it
starts everyday anew, as new ‘monads’ are spontaneously generated” (Roger
1980, p. 282).44
It is maybe surprising that this project was such a long time in the
making. As Caron (1988, p. 226) puts it: “… biology as a science was
not considered a reality by the scientists of the early nineteenth century.
It was at best a project, but a very poorly organized one if it did indeed
exist.” This explains why the life sciences “displayed a remarkable ten-
dency to be institutionalized separately rather than to remain together
as an internally differentiated whole” (Harwood 2009, p. 90).45 The biol-
ogy project had not occupied an important place in Lamarck’s oeuvre (see
note 25) whereas Treviranus’ work does not seem to have been very inﬂu-
ential. It has even been said that as soon as the ideal of a biological science
had been formulated, scholars began to abandon it (Theunissen and Visser
occupying the adjacent ofﬁce as someone who hammers on rocks, and nobody who boasts the
mathematical expertise required for tornado dynamics wants to be labelled a ‘geologist’.”
43. This helps to explain why historians of biology have devoted more pages to the
study of the history of the idea of evolution “than to any other subject falling under the
rubric of biology” (Richards 2003, p. 17).
44. I do not agree, though, with his claim that “neither Darwin nor the present
synthetic theory of evolution nor modern genetics are interested in history” (Roger 1980,
p. 282). See, in respect with Lamarck’s ahistorical or “biotheoretical” theory of evolution, also
Tanghe (2019).
45. He adds that it is not clear why this has occurred “but its historiographical impli-
cation is that ‘biology’ is best conceived as a collection of loosely connected areas of inquiry…
sharing little more than their concern with living organisms” (Harwood 2009, p. 90). This
may be true for much of the history of biology but it is remarkable that he does not mention
the later, integrating role of “the overall unifying concept of biology,” called evolution.
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1996, p. 54). That, however, is clearly exaggerated. Schiller (1980) even
notes a strong interest, in the nineteenth century, in the construction of a
synthetic life science. However, it was, initially, not primarily based on the
notion of evolution (or presented under the term biology). “Many attempts
were made [in France] to found such a science, ‘physiology’ having certainly
the greatest success” (Caron 1988, p. 236). Comte, for example, tried to es-
tablish a philosophy of living organisms and of life, “based primarily, but
not solely, on physiology” (Caron 1988, p. 235). As Schiller (1980, p. 85)
points out, all these attempts seem to have been inspired by a common (but
mistaken, physics-inspired) motif: that of ascertaining “‘die Lehre von dem
Leben’, ‘les lois de la vie’, and ‘the laws of organic life’.”46 The publication of
On the Origin was therefore indeed “the climax of half a century of searching
for the philosophical [i.e., explanatory] foundations of the new science,
‘biology’” (Rehbock 1983, p. 6). However, it would, as said, take another
century before these integrative foundations were complete.
Intriguingly, once Darwin put the notion of evolution ﬁrmly on the scien-
tiﬁc agenda, the biohistorical integration of the life sciences began in very
much the same, Whewellian way that the geohistorical integration of the
Earth sciences had started out in the previous century: with a descriptive
phase. Bowler (1996, p. 24) has pointed out that the reconstruction of life’s
ancestry that followed the publication of On the Origin (1859) was “so extensive
a project that it necessarily affected a wide range of existing disciplines. …
Specialists in many different areas were forced to interact because they
were all concerned with similar questions of origins.” It primarily con-
cerned morphology, systematics and paleontology. This is one of the rea-
sons why the conscious attempt to construct a complete science of biology
“received its strongest impulse … from Darwin” (Huxley 1884, p. 4).47
46. John Jamieson Carswell Smart (1963) was the ﬁrst scholar to emphasize that there
are no laws in biology.
47. Huxley himself did not believe, though, that the science of life that he envisioned
could or should be founded upon the notion of evolution. In 1860, biology became a uni-
versity level subject in the newly created science degree curriculum at the University of
London, thanks to the efforts of Huxley and Joseph D. Hooker. However, it served merely
to train teachers and lacked a research program. This maybe also explains why it was not
evolutionary inspired. The Darwinists, and particularly Huxley, had, at the time, “very
little interest in seeing evolution raised to the level of a fully mature, objective, culture-
free science (Ruse 1996)” (Ruse 1999, p. 77). Huxley’s comprehensive biology “united a
study of plants and animals on the basis of their common protoplasmic structure and
function. It was formed not from natural history but from physiology, structural botany,
and pre-eminently comparative anatomy, which gave the new ‘biology’ its distinctive mor-
phological aspect” (Desmond 1996, p. 273n20). Huxley refused to “mix up” evolution
with his morphology, “fearing that it would ‘throw Biology into confusion’” (Desmond
1996, p. 39).
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And why the word biology “took root in the 1870s” (Desmond 1996,
p. 420).48
This has also been called the short term effect on biology of Darwin’s
theory of evolution (Theunissen and Visser 1996, p. 150). The long-term
effect concerned the causal dimension of biohistory (i.e., Whewell’s second
component and phase): it was only in the mid-twentieth century, with the
development of a consensus theory about the causes of evolution—the so-
called modern evolutionary synthesis—, that the life sciences became more
integrated.49 This theory also encompassed an application of evolutionary
causes to the paleontological facts (i.e., the realization of Whewell’s third
phase). Before this happy event, the question of the causes of evolution
divided, rather than united the life sciences.
As late as 1929, J. H. Woodger (1929, p. 11) observed that the process
of fragmentation in the biological sciences had, in contrast with what had
happened in other sciences, “not been compensated by the help of any
principle of … unifying power, and the possibility of a uniﬁed biology
seems to recede more and more from our grasp.” Ironically, this despairing
statement marked the eve of the emergence of biology as a (more) uniﬁed
science. In 1942, Julian Huxley (1942, p. 26) observed that biology had
“become a more uniﬁed science” and that it was “coming to rival the unity
of older sciences like physics.” A few years later, the Society for the Study
of Evolution (1946) and the American Institute of Biological Sciences
(1947) were founded. In 1957, George Gaylord Simpson, an important
architect of the evolutionary synthesis, could proudly introduce a biology
textbook with the assertion that he and his co-authors strongly believed
that there had come into being a uniﬁed science of life.
It is of course during these crucial decades (the 1930s and 1940s) that the
modern evolutionary synthesis was created and that evolutionary biology be-
came an epistemically mature science (Ruse 1996). This was, essentially, ac-
complished by establishing the compatibility of a Darwinian population
genetic interpretation of evolution “with the ﬁndings of all of the sciences
48. Whewell (1840, 1, p. 544) pointed out, in 1840, that it had already become “not
uncommon among good writers.” See, in this respect, also Google’s n-gram viewer (https://
books.google.com/ngrams).
49. Bowler (1980, p. 102) even compares the modern evolutionary synthesis with the
advent of the plate tectonics paradigm in geology: “… it is signiﬁcant that both geology
and evolutionary biology were revolutionized in the twentieth century through a revival of
interest in the causal approach. Here plate tectonics and the genetical theory of natural
selection play parallel roles, overtaking and absorbing an earlier, historical approach to
the past.” As pointed out before: the theory of plate tectonics added a new, causal dimen-
sion to the study of the history of the Earth’s crust, but it did not initiate the causative
study of that history.
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dealing with evolution” (Burian 1988, p. 250). The evolutionary synthesis
was, confusingly, indeed the result of two syntheses: one between Darwinism
and Mendelism and a second synthesis of empirical data and concepts from a
wide variety of life sciences around that ﬁrst synthesis. It is that second syn-
thesis or the synthesis sensu lato that uniﬁed many life sciences. “Evolution
… became the ‘central science’ of biology which bound together, and
grounded, the heterogeneous practices of biology into a uniﬁed and progres-
sive science” (Smocovitis 1992, p. 3).50 Or: “the evolutionary synthesis sig-
naled the uniﬁcation of the biological sciences” (Smocovitis 1992, p. 3).
The reason why it uniﬁed these sciences is that it provided an explanation
for contemporary life phenomena. Whereas geohistory mainly served as a
common describendum and explanandum for geologists, evolution, as ex-
plained by the modern evolutionary synthesis, indeed primarily constitutes
a common explanans of modern biological phenomena.51 It is this idea of
evolution as explanans of a wide variety of life phenomena, studied in various
biological disciplines, that is expressed in Dobzhansky’s famous saying that
“nothing makes sense in biology except in the light of evolution.” Or, as
Raven and Johnson write in their classic textbook Biology (1992): “biological
principles do not exist in a vacuum; there is almost always an evolutionary ex-
planation that explains why things are the way they are. From the outset of writ-
ing Biology, our goal has been to describe biology in its evolutionary context”
(p. vi, my italics) because “the theory of evolution provides the conceptual
framework that uniﬁes biology as a science” (p. 7). And: “Presenting biology
in an evolutionary framework enables the student to understand principles,
and so actually makes teaching, and learning, easier” (p. vi).
Evidently, evolution could only meaningfully fulﬁll this integrating,
explanatory role, once there had emerged a broad agreement, among biol-
ogists, about the mechanisms behind evolution, i.e., the hidden and com-
plex mechanics behind the origin of new adaptive features and species and
macroevolutionary trends.52 This is a second reason for the extraordinarily
50. See also Smocovitis (1996). This does not seem to have been a conscious goal of the
architects of the synthesis, though. Smocovitis quotes Ernst Mayr as saying that it wasn’t
until the 1950s that “one could begin to think seriously about the role of evolutionary
biology to achieve a uniﬁcation of the previously badly splintered biology” (Smocovitis
1996, p. 202).
51. Not everybody agrees with this assessment. For paleontologists like Stephen J. Gould,
“the autonomy of biology and the role of evolution as the ‘central organizing principle’ would
come from an argument they inherited from Simpson—chance and contingency in the form
of unique historical events” (Smocovitis 1992, pp. 50, 153). For paleontologists, evolution or
biohistory has indeed the same status that geohistory has for geologists: it is something that
must be described (describendum) and explained (explanandum).
52. Depew and Weber (1988, p. 317) point out that the synthesis “has been rightly
construed more as a treaty than a theory …” Its main merit was that it ended seemingly
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long lag between the ﬁrst formulation of the biology project and its actual
realization. Not only did it take a long time before the idea of evolution
was scientiﬁcally mature (1859) and could begin to unify the life sciences,
it also took a long time before evolution could subsequently fulﬁl its main
integrative function as a generally agreed upon explanans of modern life
phenomena.
The uniﬁcation was not perfect, though. The evolutionary synthesis re-
mains, up to this day, a contentious paradigm.53 Also, not long after the
establishment of this synthesis as an integrative paradigm, a war broke out
between, on the one hand, classical or organismic biology and, on the other
hand, molecular biology (and biochemistry).54 Ernst Mayr observed at the
time that the word biology suggested a uniﬁed science but “recent devel-
opments have made it increasingly clear that biology is a most complex
area—indeed, that the word biology is a label for two largely separate
ﬁelds which differ greatly in method, Fragestellung, and basic concepts”
(1961, p. 1501). One concerns the functional (how?), the other the evolu-
tionary (why?). This distinction between two biologies evidently corre-
sponds quite well with the distinction, in the modern study of Earth,
between, on the one hand, geology and, on the other hand, geophysics
and geochemistry. Like this last split, the rift between the two biologies
also had an important methodological dimension. Molecular biologists are,
like the geophysicists, methodologically much closer aligned to the phys-
ical sciences.55 Hence the danger that some biologists felt at the time of
being engulfed by these sciences and of losing their autonomy: “With the
articulation and reﬁnement of the molecular basis for genetic change, bi-
ology faced its greatest threat of complete engulfment by the physical sci-
ences” (Smocovitis 1992, p. 58). At some places (like Harvard University),
endless preparadigmatic disputes, by showing that it could explain “virtually all of the
known phenomena and patterns that ought to be explained by an evolutionary theory”
and that it “was not necessary to contemplate or turn to any rival theories” (1988, p. 317).
53. See, in this respect, Tanghe et al. (2018). As Burian (1988, p. 248) puts it: “the
synthesis offered a modus vivendi that allowed theorists, experimentalists, and ﬁeld natural-
ists coming from different disciplines to work together on various problems from within a
common framework.”
54. See chapter 12, The Molecular Wars, (Wilson 1994). See also Smocovitis (1992,
pp. 57–60) and Harwood (2009, pp. 94–95).
55. The evolutionary synthesis was criticized for not having “the predictive and explan-
atory virtues and the testability of Newtonian mechanics” (Burian 1988, p. 259). It is often
(still) not understood that evolutionary theory “cannot escape the essential historicity of
biological evolution” (p. 261) and that “the basic principles of historical theories do not
play the same role or have the same character as the basic laws of mechanics or other ‘ahis-
torical’ theories” (p. 262).
830 Whewell’s Four Palætiological Domains
the situation became so dire that a formal division of biology departments
took place between these two branches.
It were, not coincidentally, primarily the architects of the unifying evo-
lutionary synthesis who came to the rescue of the recently attained peace
and unity within the biological sciences. It was, for example, in this con-
text that Dobzhansky argued forcibly for the unifying power of evolution
and that he coined his aforementioned phrase “nothing makes sense in bi-
ology except in the light of evolution.” “If the living world has not arisen
from common ancestors by means of an evolutionary process,” he wrote,
“then the fundamental unity of living things is a hoax and their diversity
is a joke” (Dobzhansky 1964, p. 449). Without the light of evolution, he
later stated, biology “becomes a pile of sundry facts, some of them interest-
ing or curious but making no meaningful picture as a whole” (Dobzhansky
1973, p. 129). Whereas a signiﬁcant segment of the community of modern
Earth scientists does not seem to consider geohistory to be the central uni-
fying concept of the Earth sciences, many modern biologists generally still
see evolution as the central unifying concept of their science.56 The fact that
this uniﬁcation is far from perfect does not undermine this belief: an impor-
tant idea in Betty Smocovitis’ Unifying Biology: The Evolutionary Synthesis and
Evolutionary Biology (1996) is that the uniﬁcation of the life sciences on the
basis of the notion of evolution is very much a work in progress.
4. Concluding Remarks
I have tried to shed new light on the modern palætiological sciences of
cosmology, geology and biology by studying their historical development
from a comparative perspective, as recommended by William Whewell
more than a century and a half ago. The discovery of the deep history of
life, Earth and the universe played a crucial role in the historical develop-
ment of these three sciences: it separates their prehistory from their actual
history. In the case of geology and biology, the resemblance doesn’t end
there: the prehistorical phase of these master sciences was characterized
by the existence of an unorganized and unfocused diversity of ﬁelds of
knowledge or disciplines. The concept of an independent science of geol-
ogy and biology emerged during the second scientiﬁc revolution. The his-
toricization of Earth and life subsequently played a crucial role in the actual
construction of these master sciences, thanks to its integrative function: it
56. Even though the actual study of evolution can hardly be called a central goal of
modern biology. Ruse (1996, p. 3) points out, in this respect, that the 1994 edition of
Peterson’s Guide to Graduate Programs in Biological and Agricultural Sciences is very suggestive:
it advertises about 325 programs in molecular biology but only 45 in evolution. “Overall in
the Guide, cell and molecular biology get over three hundred pages whereas ecology, envi-
ronmental biology, and evolutionary biology get barely ﬁfty.”
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glued together various Earth and life disciplines. Perhaps, this simple
Bauplan should become the explicit backbone or core of historical accounts
of the development of both geology and biology, although I immediately
want to reiterate that the history of both sciences can, evidently, not be
reduced to this pattern.
A look at the past of geology and biology through the lens of this com-
mon Bauplan revealed, furthermore, several other intriguing similarities
and differences between both sciences. The most intriguing similarity is
maybe the ontological distinction that was antecedent to the birth of ge-
ology and biology. A crucial difference between both sciences is that ge-
ology (sensu stricto) was and is much more focused on the reconstruction of
geohistory than biology is on the reconstruction of the history of life—that
is the job of one particular life science, paleontology—, which, in turn, helps
explain why the integration of the life sciences took a much longer time than
the integration of geological disciplines: evolution could only fulﬁl its inte-
grative function as explanans of life phenomena with the mid-twentieth
century development of the so-called evolutionary synthesis.
Lastly, let me come back to the question why Whewell’s fourth broad
palaetiological domain, man, has, in sharp contrast with his other three
domains, not become the subject of a separate palaetiological master sci-
ence (even though some of the sciences that study man are, evidently, pa-
laetiological in nature). The idea of a broad science of man is ancient and
there have been attempts to integrate the human sciences or certainly cer-
tain human sciences, from a historical or an evolutionary perspective, for
example by the French school of “Les Annales,” founded by Lucien Febvre
and Marc Bloch. Why have such tentative attempts to turn the study of
man into a palaetiological master science failed? Or, more precisely, why
has the discovery and exploration of the deep biological and cultural his-
tory of man not facilitated the construction of an equivalent of cosmology,
geology and biology? This simple question is maybe the main dividend of
the here presented comparative study of the scientiﬁc fate of Whewell’s
four palaetiological domains. It seems to me, in any case, to be a question
that deserves more historiographic attention.
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